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Abstract 
This paper documents and analyzes crisis-related changes in government debt issuance 
practices in the euro zone countries and Denmark. Using a newly constructed database on 
primary market debt issuance during 2007–11, we find evidence of a shift away from pre-
crisis standards of best funding practices—competitive auctions of debt instruments with a 
fixed coupon, long maturity and local currency denomination (DLTF). Exploiting the cross-
country panel data dimension of the data, we conclude that the crisis as such and changes in 
the macroeconomic environment and investor sentiment can account for a significant 
proportion of the deviation. The negative effect of the crisis on DLTF debt issuance was 
especially pronounced in high debt euro area countries, and has forced governments to 
assume additional risk.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis has had a major impact on government debt issuance 
practices in the euro zone countries and Denmark. These practices had broadly converged 
to a common standard prior to the crisis: placement via competitive auctions of long-term, 
fixed rate debt denominated in national currency. The standard was intended to achieve low 
borrowing costs while minimizing rollover and currency risks. However, in tandem with the 
unfolding global financial crisis, starting in mid-2008, the increase in sovereign funding 
needs and sharp reduction in investor risk appetite have forced sovereigns in the euro zone to 
move away from the previous standard and, as risk premiums have risen, so has the risk 
borne by the sovereign borrower.  
 
While the pressures and direction of change have been similar across countries, their 
impact has varied considerably. The differentiation is in part related to the size of gross 
financing needs before the crisis. Countries such as Ireland which had a budget surplus and 
small government debt prior to the crisis were confronted with a surge in gross funding needs 
from low pre-crisis levels, and they had to re-introduce issuance procedures and instruments 
to meet these needs. Other countries, Belgium and Italy for instance, entered the crisis with a 
deficit and already high debt and hence substantial gross financing needs. In these countries, 
additional issuance due to the crisis-related widening of the deficit resulted in a relatively 
small increase in gross financing needs, which could be absorbed through limited 
adjustments in well-established mechanisms and instruments. 
 
This paper studies changes in euro zone and Danish issuance practices and their 
consequences from three perspectives. First, it explores the determinants of the burgeoning 
gross debt issuance during the crisis. Next, the paper examines changes in issuance 
procedures, with a particular focus on the diminishing role of auctions in particular, 
reflecting challenging market conditions. Finally, it turns to shifts in instrument choice and 
their implications for the allocation of risks between sovereigns and investors.  
 
The analysis is based on a newly constructed database. The dataset includes detailed 
information on the more than 6,000 debt issuances by central governments in the euro zone 
and Denmark during 2007–11. It contains data on the issuance and maturity dates, the nature 
of the instrument, its currency denomination and coupon structure, the placement technique, 
and the issuance yield and/or price. For the purpose of the paper’s econometric analysis, the 
data are divided into a pre-crisis and a crisis period. The database’s panel structure facilitates 
a focus on cross-country differences.  
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The paper complements the expanding literature on euro zone sovereign spreads 
following the onset of the crisis. This literature has focused on secondary market and CDS 
spreads.2  Our paper focuses on the primary market and is the first systematic study of 
issuance information to analyze the impact of the crisis on euro zone sovereign issuing 
procedures and instruments in response to changed market conditions, and the resulting shifts 
in the allocation of risks between sovereigns and investors.3 These changes in risk allocation 
cannot be identified by an analysis of movements in spreads. In future work, we intend to 
further explore the links between issuances and primary and secondary market spreads. 
 
The paper first documents the trends in gross government debt issuance and its 
composition. Reflecting automatic stabilizers and fiscal stimulus packages, central 
government deficits in the euro zone widened from 1 percent of GDP in 2007 to 5 percent of 
GDP in 2009. The sharp increase in deficits and support to the financial sector raised central 
government debt in the zone (relative to GDP) from 54 percent to 65 percent over the same 
time span. The surge in deficits and debt was accompanied by shifts towards 
international/external debt, rising spreads, increased use of syndicates, and a spike in foreign 
currency denominated issuance. Deficit-to-GDP ratios narrowed in most euro zone countries 
in 2010–11, but debt-to-GDP ratios generally continued to increase. 
 
Next, a panel econometric analysis of the factors influencing the level and composition 
of government debt issuance is carried out. A dynamic specification with random country 
effects links the level of issuance to a crisis dummy (defined as 0 during January 2007–June 
2008, and 1 during July 2008–December 2011), the debt stock, key macroeconomic variables 
and a business confidence indicator. To relate the composition of issuance to the same set of 
explanatory variables, an estimation technique is employed which takes into account that the 
dependent variable (a share) is bounded between zero and one and that unobserved country 
heterogeneity may be present. To further explore this heterogeneity, the two sets of 
regressions were run for different country groupings based on combinations of debt and 
deficit thresholds: high debt (Belgium, Greece, Italy); high deficit (Belgium, Greece, France, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain); and moderate deficit (countries other than the high deficit 
ones).  
 
The main results from the econometric analysis for the sample as a whole are broadly 
in line with theoretical priors. Notably, the crisis shifted the composition of issuance away 
from domestic currency, fixed interest rate instruments with long maturity (DLTF debt) 
toward shorter maturities, a foreign currency denomination, or a floating rate. But, 
                                                 
2
 For a recent summary of this literature, see Barbosa and Costa (2010). 
3
 Biais et al. (2004) is an earlier paper studying the determinants of primary issuance in the euro zone Treasury 
Bill markets. Hoogduin et al. (2010) use aggregate issuance information from the ECB to estimate a 
government debt management reaction function for the euro area.  
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controlling for the crisis effects, lower inflation and higher growth supported the issuance of 
instruments with long maturity, domestic currency denomination, and a fixed coupon. 
Stronger investor sentiment was associated with a lower level of issuance (smaller deficits) 
and facilitated the use of auctions. 
 
The econometric results for country groupings confirm considerable cross-country 
heterogeneity. In particular, in high debt countries, the negative effect of the crisis on the 
share of DLTF debt is highly significant. In high deficit countries, the debt stock, growth and 
inflation are significant with the expected sign in explaining the share of DLTF issuance, but 
the crisis dummy is not. In moderate deficit/moderate debt countries, the crisis dummy is 
again significant, and investor sentiment and spreads are also significant, but with a sign 
different from the expected one.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the new database and its 
construction, and presents stylized facts and evidence on shifts in the composition of 
government debt issuance just before and during the crisis. Section III presents the 
econometric methodology and estimation results. Section IV concludes and identifies 
possible fiscal policy implications. 
 
 
II.   DATABASE AND STYLIZED FACTS 
A.   Database 
The government debt issuance data employed in this paper are taken from a newly 
constructed database. The database includes information on individual gross debt issuances 
by the central governments of the 17 euro zone member countries4 and Denmark (the 
currency of which is tightly pegged to the euro) during 2007–11.5 In principle, all issuances 
on which public information is available are covered, with the exception of commercial paper 
program transactions and instruments tailored to retail investors. In total, more than 6,000 
issuances are included. The database also covers pre-announced but subsequently cancelled 
auctions. The information is organized by country and, within each country, by the date of 
the transaction. The database includes information on the issuance and maturity dates of the 
instrument, its currency denomination and coupon structure, the placement technique, and the 
issuance yield and/or price. In case auctions are used for the issuance, data on the auction 
results, such as the share of non-competitive bids and the bid-to-cover ratio, are added.  
 
                                                 
4
 One of the 17 member countries, Estonia, did not issue sovereign debt in the period under consideration. 
5
 Data on general government components other than central government are not included in view of data 
availability and cross-country comparability issues.  
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The database draws from various sources, the mutual consistency of which was 
checked:  
 
 Announcements of debt issuances and their results on the website of national debt 
agencies/national central banks, and on dedicated web pages of Bloomberg and 
Reuters.6  
 Longer series on auction results and syndicated issuances posted on the website of 
national debt agencies/ national central banks; and longer series on Treasury bill and 
government bond issuances made available by Bloomberg. 
 Information on debt issuances and stocks provided by trading platforms (MTS, 
domestic stock exchanges). 
 
B.   Stylized Facts 
1. Larger bond issuance 
 
Gross debt issuance increased in all euro zone countries as the crisis unfolded. For 
illustrative purposes only we split the sample into a two-year pre-crisis period (January 
2007—December 2008) and a two-year crisis period (January 2009—December 2010)7. 
During the crisis period gross issuance in the euro zone as a share of GDP almost doubled. A 
large increase was observed in France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Spain in particular. 
Among the smaller euro zone countries, Cyprus and Malta stand out. Italy already before the 
crisis issued a lot of debt, and gross issuance further rose during the crisis.  
 
                                                 
6
 Bloomberg and Reuters also provide market comments on important auctions and syndicated issuances. 
7
 In the econometric exercise in part III, we also consider the 2011 data and we refine the timing and associate a 
crisis dummy with all observations after June 2008, as the crisis began significantly to affect government debt 
issuance in the second half of 2008.  
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Central Government Bond Issuance
(In percent of GDP)
2007-2008
2009-2010
Sources: DeBroeck-Guscina Debt Issuance Database, WEO, and Haver Analytics.
1/For cross-country consistency includes only gross issuances that are captured in the database.  We exclude 
internationally issued TBills and commercial paper, buybacks, taps, IMF loans, cancelled or failed auctions.
 
 
Different combinations of roll-over and net issuance underlie cross-country differences 
in gross issuance. For example, and as indicated in the introduction, in Ireland, the pre-crisis 
debt was low, and gross issuance during the crisis mainly reflected the sharp widening of the 
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deficit. In Belgium and Italy, on the other hand, countries with already high debt before the 






2. More Frequent and Larger Auctions 
 
Additional gross issuance needs were mostly met through an increase in the frequency 
of auctions. A comparison of the number of auctions before and during the crisis shows an 
increase in almost all euro zone countries. The increase was most pronounced in Ireland, 































































































Total Number of Auctions 1/
2007-2008
2009-2010
Sources: DeBroeck-Guscina Debt Issuance Database, WEO, and Haver Analytics.
1/For cross-country consistency includes only gross issuances that are captured in the database.  We exclude 
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In addition to an increase in the frequency of bond auctions, the average size of 
issuances went up in most euro area countries. The increase in size is especially 
noteworthy in Austria, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia, and also in Greece. But not all the euro 
zone countries followed this pattern: the average issuance size fell in Finland, Germany, and 
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Average Size of Auction 1/
(in millions of Euros)
2007-2008
2009-2010
Sources: DeBroeck-Guscina Debt Issuance Database, WEO, and Haver Analytics.
1/For cross-country consistency includes only gross issuances that are captured in the database.  We exclude 
internationally issued TBills and commercial paper, buybacks, taps, IMF loans, cancelled or failed auctions.  
 
3. Spread widening and spread differentiation 
 
Rising deficits and debt have pushed up and disentangled sovereign primary market 
spreads. Spread movements relative to the German Bund since the start of the crisis have 
reflected increasing concerns over debt sustainability and sovereign risk. Moreover, the 
spreads increased significantly more in higher risk countries such as Greece and Ireland. 
Spreads in the primary market generally moved in line with those in the secondary market. 
 
4. An evolving role of international placements and syndication 
 
A number of euro zone countries have shifted issuance to the international market. For 
instance, in Austria, more than 95 percent of outstanding debt is domestically issued, but 
only 60 percent of the new issuances were placed in domestic markets during the crisis 
period. Such a movement was not observed in other euro zone countries, however. For 
example, in Slovenia, the share of domestically issued bonds increased during this period. 
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These shifts reflect, among other factors, the depth of the market for domestically issued 






































Share of  Domestically Issued in Total Issuance 1/
(in percent of total central government debt issuance)
2007-2008
2009-2010
Sources: DeBroeck-Guscina Debt Issuance Database, WEO, and Haver Analytics.
1/For cross-country consistency includes only gross issuances that are captured in the database.  We exclude 
internationally issued TBills and commercial paper, buybacks, taps, IMF loans, cancelled or failed auctions.
 
 
The crisis has affected the use of syndication as a selling technique. Prior to the crisis, a 
number of countries, Belgium and France for instance, used syndication to introduce a new 
bond to the market, followed by re-issuances through auctions. In Austria, Finland and 
Ireland, on the other hand, syndication accounted for most of the issuance in 2007 and 2008. 
Recourse to syndicates generally increased during the crisis: Cyprus and Slovakia showed the 
most pronounced increase, and Belgium and France, in a deviation from past practice, used 
syndication beyond first issuances. However, in some cases, for instance in Austria, Ireland8, 
and Portugal, the share of syndicated issuance was reduced during the crisis.  
                                                 
8
 Ireland issued only three bonds during 2007–08, all of which were placed via syndication. 




























































Share of  Syndicates in Central Government Debt Issuance 1/
(in percent of total debt issued)
2007-2008
2009-2010
Sources: DeBroeck-Guscina Debt Issuance Database, WEO, and Haver Analytics.
1/For cross-country consistency includes only gross issuances that are captured in the database.  We exclude 
internationally issued TBills and commercial paper, buybacks, taps, IMF loans, cancelled or failed auctions.
 
 
5. Shorter Maturities  
 
The maturity of new issuances shortened in a range of euro zone countries. In some 
cases, Belgium and the Netherlands, for instance, capital injections in the financial sector in 
the fall of 2008 were initially financed with issuing and rolling over short-term debt, 
followed by a gradual switching to longer maturities, with a view to smoothing the impact of 
the additional debt supply in the long-term market segment. In other countries, very low 
short-term interest rates, a reflection of major monetary policy easing in the euro zone, 
motivated the shift to shorter maturities. The increase in short-term debt issuances was 
especially pronounced in Greece (which hardly issued any Treasury bills prior to the crisis), 
Ireland, Slovakia, and Spain.  
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Share of Short-term Bonds
(in percent of total issuance 1/)
2007-2008
2009-2010
Sources: DeBroeck-Guscina Debt Issuance Database, WEO, and Haver Analytics.
1/For cross-country consistency includes only gross issuances that are captured in the database.  We exclude 
internationally issued TBills and commercial paper, buybacks, taps, IMF loans, cancelled or failed auctions.
 
 
6. Somewhat less local currency fixed interest rate debt 
 
The crisis has affected the composition of debt issuance by principal and coupon 
structure. Prior to the crisis, the most common issuance mode in the euro zone countries was 
debt denominated in domestic currency, with long maturity and a fixed interest rate. The 
share of debt with the principal and/or the coupon linked to inflation, a foreign currency or a 
short-term interest rate was relatively small. In the crisis period, the share of domestic local 
currency fixed rate debt (DLTF) went down significantly in Cyprus and Greece, and also in 
Denmark, Slovakia and Spain. It remained relatively stable in Belgium, Germany, and 
France. A few countries actually increased the share of DLTF issuances—Austria, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal.   










































Decreased Share of DLTF Bonds
















































Increased Share of DLTF Bonds
(in percent of total issuance 1/)
2007-2008
2009-2010
Sources: DeBroeck-Guscina Debt Issuance Database, WEO, and Haver Analytics.
1/For cross-country consistency includes only gross issuances that are captured in the database.  We exclude 
internationally issued TBills and commercial paper, buybacks, taps, IMF loans, cancelled or failed auctions.  
 
 
The evolution of the use of alternative principal and coupon formulas was not uniform. 
 
a. Less CPI-Indexed Debt 
 
Inflation indexed bonds were not common in 
the euro area before the crisis. In fact, when 
the crisis broke, only four member countries 
still issued debt indexed to some measure of 
inflation. In the 2009–10 period, France and 
Italy significantly reduced the share of 
inflation-indexed bonds, and Greece 


































Share of CPI-Indexed Bonds in Total Bond Issuance
(in percent of total issuance 1/)
2007-2008
2009-2010
Sources: DeBroeck-Guscina Debt Issuance Database, WEO, and Haver Analytics.
1/For cross-country consistency includes only gross issuances that are captured in 
the database.  We exclude internationally issued TBills and commercial paper, 
buybacks, taps, IMF loans, cancelled or failed auctions.
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b. More Foreign Currency-Denominated Debt 
 
A number of euro zone sovereigns raised the proportion of foreign currency-denominated 
debt during the crisis period. In particular, they issued US dollar debt in the fall of 2009 to 
take advantage of the strength of the euro and low US dollar interest rates in that period. The 
share of foreign currency denominated debt increased especially in Denmark but also in 
Belgium, Finland, Italy and Portugal. Germany issued US dollar denominated bonds for the 
first time in decade. Austria, on the other hand, significantly reduced the share of foreign 
currency denominated bonds, while Greece and also Slovakia, which adopted the euro in the 




































Share of Foreign Currency Bonds in Total Bond Issuance
(in percent of total issuance 1/)
2007-2008
2009-2010
Sources: DeBroeck-Guscina Debt Issuance Database, WEO, and Haver Analytics.
1/For cross-country consistency includes only gross issuances that are captured in 
the database.  We exclude internationally issued TBills and commercial paper, 
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c. More Floating Rate Debt 
 
A range of euro zone members issued a higher share of floating rate debt. Greece almost 
doubled the share of floating rate bond issuances in the crisis period compared with the 
previous two years. Some countries, for instance, Finland, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia, 














































Share of Floating Rate Bonds in Total Bond Issuance
(in percent of total issuance 1/)
2007-2008
2009-2010
Sources: DeBroeck-Guscina Debt Issuance Database, WEO, and Haver Analytics.
1/For cross-country consistency includes only gross issuances that are captured in 
the database.  We exclude internationally issued TBills and commercial paper, 
buybacks, taps, IMF loans, cancelled or failed auctions.
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The table below summarizes shifts in the structure of government borrowing before and 
during the crisis. 
  
Country Time Period Auctions Domestic Short-term For. currency CPI indexed Variable rate DLTF
Austria 2007-2008 45.8 82.2 10.6 17.3 0.0 7.4 45.8
2009-2010 75.5 96.6 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 75.5
Belgium 2007-2008 88.2 100.0 48.1 0.7 0.0 1.5 40.1
2009-2010 86.7 100.0 68.4 1.6 0.0 1.4 41.4
Cyprus 2007-2008 100.0 100.0 28.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 71.1
2009-2010 53.8 53.8 38.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.3
Denmark 2007-2008 82.3 82.3 18.8 17.7 0.0 0.0 63.5
2009-2010 65.8 65.8 16.7 31.9 0.0 0.0 49.1
Finland 2007-2008 58.0 96.6 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 58.0
2009-2010 50.1 94.1 0.4 4.5 0.0 1.0 50.1
France 2007-2008 99.0 100.0 65.9 0.0 4.5 0.0 29.6
2009-2010 99.1 100.0 66.5 0.0 2.5 0.0 30.1
Germany 2007-2008 99.2 99.4 32.3 0.0 3.4 0.0 64.3
2009-2010 99.5 100.0 31.9 0.5 3.5 0.0 64.7
Greece 2007-2008 45.3 91.5 2.9 1.1 10.4 6.4 42.3
2009-2010 29.2 99.9 24.8 0.0 0.0 11.0 5.4
Ireland 2007-2008 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2009-2010 69.6 100.0 42.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.4
Italy 2007-2008 99.4 99.4 37.3 0.4 4.0 4.3 54.0
2009-2010 95.9 99.2 29.6 0.6 3.2 6.1 58.7
Malta 2007-2008 99.6 100.0 77.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.0
2009-2010 100.0 100.0 73.4 0.0 0.0 1.7 24.9
Netherlands 2007-2008 100.0 100.0 80.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.5
2009-2010 100.0 100.0 76.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.0
Portugal 2007-2008 82.0 100.0 31.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.5
2009-2010 84.1 97.9 31.7 2.0 0.0 2.2 52.5
Slovakia 2007-2008 81.9 81.9 9.5 18.1 0.0 0.0 72.4
2009-2010 67.5 88.2 15.5 0.0 0.0 2.4 49.6
Slovenia 2007-2008 28.3 64.1 15.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5
2009-2010 15.8 100.0 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.7
Spain 2007-2008 91.9 98.6 10.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 81.5
2009-2010 90.4 99.2 21.2 0.6 0.0 0.3 69.2
Source: DeBroeck-Guscina Debt Issuance Database
Table 1. Changes in the Structure of Sovereign Borrowing
(in percent of total issuance)
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III.   ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Complementing the descriptive analysis above, an econometric exercise can provide 
additional insight into crisis-related changes in government debt issuance and issuance 
practices. In particular, the exercise aims to address the questions as to what impact the 
crisis had on total debt issuance and as to what extent it moved the composition of debt 
issuance away from pre-crisis placement techniques and DLTF standards. It also examines 
what the role of macroeconomic variables and investor sentiment has been. These questions 
are explored using a panel of 16 euro area countries9 and Denmark for the January 2007–
December 2011 period.  
 
The econometric analysis draws from the newly constructed debt database.10 However, 
for the purposes of this analysis, individual issuances are aggregated into monthly flows. The 
macroeconomic variables (economic sentiment, industrial production, inflation, central 
government debt-to-GDP ratio, exchange rates, and spreads) are provided by Haver 
Analytics. Variable definitions and sources are in Appendix Table 1. 
 
A.   Determinants of Total Issuance 
Regression analysis can help clarify the impact of the crisis, the debt stock, 
macroeconomic variables and investor sentiment on issuance.11 Higher debt typically 
implies higher roll-over needs and hence higher gross issuance. However, depending upon 
the maturity structure of the debt, this effect may be absent in the relatively short period 
considered in this paper. In terms of macroeconomic variables, higher growth and higher 
business confidence are typically associated with lower headline deficits, while higher levels 
of inflation will tend to go together with a higher nominal deficit, and thus more borrowing. 
However, the prior effect of a change in the inflation rate is ambiguous: to the extent it is 
unanticipated, a change in inflation also acts as a tax on debt and affects the government 
budget constraint in real terms, with implications for gross financing needs.  
 
The determinants of total issuance can be examined in a panel set-up. The panel data 
equation in levels can be written as: 
 
, , 1 , ,i t i t i t i i ty y X v       
 
                                                 
9
 Estonia did not issue sovereign debt in the sample period. 
10
 The information on cancelled issuances is not employed, however.  
11
 Such regression analysis can complement a simple decomposition of changes in gross issuance into rollover 
and net issuance.  
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where ,i ty  is total issuance of bonds, ,i tX  is a vector of explanatory variables, and the  s 
represent estimated coefficients. The disturbances are split into unobserved country effects 
vi,, which are i.i.d. and panel level effects ,i t . The regression coefficients are estimated using 
OLS with Newey-West standard errors.12 Using first differences eliminates the cross-
sectional effects: 
 
  ∆yi,t = ∆yi,t-1 +β∆Xi,t + u i,t    
  
Specifically, the change in the log of debt issuance (expressed in billions of euros) can be 
regressed on the changes in debt stock, inflation, growth in industrial production, and an 
economic sentiment indicator, with a crisis dummy added. The results of the regressions with 
changes in total issuance as the dependent variable are summarized in Table 2. 
 
The significant estimation results for the whole sample are broadly in line with priors. 
Equation (6) in Table 2A represents the preferred specification. Pressures in international 
financial markets emerged in August 2007, but a full-blown global financial crisis did not 
erupt until September 2008. For the purposes of the empirical exercise we define January 
2007–June 2008 as pre-crisis era, and July 2008–December 2011 as the crisis period. The 
results are broadly similar for other definitions of the crisis period (January 2009–December 
2011). 
 
The crisis dummy is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in most specifications. 
The estimation results are robust to all combinations of the explanatory variables. A positive 
and significant coefficient on the level of debt in the previous year is in line with our prior, 
and implies that some of the increase in issuances was driven by the roll-over of existing 
debt. As to the macroeconomic variables, an increase in the inflation rate is associated with a 
drop in debt issuance at the 5 percent level. Growth is also negatively associated with 
changes in total issuance, at the 1 percent level. However, changes in industrial production, 
business confidence and the secondary market spread with a 10-year Bund are not 
statistically significant.  
 
                                                 
12
  The high degree of persistence in the dependent variable complicates the use of a GMM approach.  





Results from exploring country heterogeneity suggest significant differences between 
country groupings (Table 2B). The crisis dummy is significant at the 1 percent level in high 
deficit countries (Belgium, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain), suggesting that these 
countries increased their borrowing during the crisis above and beyond what the 
macroeconomic variables can explain. Countries not facing high deficits or high debt, 
however, increased their borrowing only marginally in response to the crisis (lower 
coefficient and only 10 percent level of significance). High debt countries potentially found it 
difficult to increase their issuance, and some eventually lost market access for long-term 
instruments (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal). Macroeconomic fundamentals 
(inflation) mattered more for high-deficit and high-debt countries than for moderate deficit 
countries (the lower level of statistical significance of these results can be explained by a 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Change in Debt Issuance  t-1 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.190*** 0.195** 0.218*** 
(0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.092) (0.091) 
Crisis period dummy 0.331*** 0.333*** 0.332*** 0.186** 0.139** 0.283*** 
(2008H2-2011) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059) (0.080) 
Change in sentiment  -0.446 -0.404 -0.419 -0.196 -0.015 
(0.631) (0.656) (0.631) (0.681) (0.694) 
Inflation -0.029 -1.419** -1.701** -2.106** 
(0.032) (0.631) (0.816) (0.959) 
Growth in IP -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.006 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
log of CG debt  t-12 0.024** 0.036*** 
(0.012) (0.014) 
Change in spread with 0.026 
U.S. bond t-1 (0.023) 
Constant 0.056 0.052 0.053 0.052 -0.009 -0.031 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.067) (0.075) 
Observations 912 912 912 912 768 720 
F statistic 12.16 9.84 8.25 10.8 9.86 5.99 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2A. Determinants of Total Debt Issuance (in differences) 
The reported results are based on seasonally adjusted variables with country and period fixed effects. Postcrisis  
dummy is defined as 0 for January 2007 through June 2008, and 1 for January July 2008 through December 
2011.  
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smaller sample). The additional borrowing of high-deficit and high-debt countries was also 
sensitive to changes in the debt stock and changes in investor sentiment. In all country 
groupings, changes in industrial production, investor’s sentiment and spreads were not 
significant in explaining changes in gross issuances. 
 
 










Change in Debt Issuance t-1 0.218*** 0.011 0.200** 0.401*** 0.240**
(0.091) (0.124) (0.083) (0.084) (0.098)
Crisis period dummy 0.283*** 0.487*** 0.142 0.025 0.153*
(0.080) (0.148) (0.108) (0.076) (0.091)
Change in sentiment -0.015 0.674 -0.529 -0.305 -0.454
(0.694) (1.164) (0.806) (0.655) (0.700)
Inflation -2.106** -16.736* -13.197** -1.067* -2.7357***
(0.959) (9.901) (6.228) (0.590) (1.017)
Growth in IP -0.006 -0.004 0.0004 -0.006 -0.007
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log of CG debt t-12 0.036*** 0.224*** 0.005 0.006 0.038**
(0.014) (0.057) (0.034) (0.018) (0.015)
Change in spread with 0.026 0.306 0.32 0.019* 0.028
U.S. bondt-1 (0.023) (0.243) (0.239) (0.010) (0.020)
Constant -0.031 -0.844*** 0.250* 0.075 0.088
(0.075) (0.284) (0.146) (0.084) (0.077)
Observations 720 288 240 432 624
F statistic 5.990 5.64 2.93 5.28 5.91
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
High deficit countries include Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, France, and Belgium.
High Debt countries  Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Ireland, and Portugal
Table 2B. Determinants of Total Debt Issuance (in differences)—Exploring Heterogeneity
The reported results are based on random effect estimation with three-month moving averages of the variables. Postcrisis dummy is defined as 0 for 
January 2007 through June 2008, and 1 for July 2008 through December 2009.
 
 
B.   Determinants of Issuance Composition 
Crisis-related funding pressures are expected to force deviations from established best 
practices of issuance instrument and procedure choice. These practices have been defined 
as issuance of domestic currency, fixed interest rate instruments with long maturity using 
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competitive auctions. DLTF instruments and competitive auctions in principle ensure that 
from the government’s point of view, the safest debt is issued. However, auctions can be 
more risky than other issuance techniques: a failed auction can undermine investor 
confidence. Direct placement and syndication, on the other hand, can reduce placement 
uncertainty, but may also limit the investor base and carry higher intermediation costs, 
including fees. Faced with the need to place a massive increase in debt, euro zone sovereign 
debt managers have been willing to entice investors by assuming more risk through 
instrument choice, and to pragmatically select issuance techniques on a case-by-case basis 
taking into account placement risk versus intermediation costs trade-offs. To the extent it can 
limit the cost of funding, a move away from DLTF debt can be a proper government debt 
management choice.  
 
The crisis as such is accordingly expected to have had the following impact on the 
composition of debt issuance: 
 
 More issuance in international markets: offers additional protection to investors in 
case of default 
 Ambiguous impact on the use of direct placement and syndicated techniques: these 
techniques can reduce placement uncertainty, but are also more costly 
 Less DLTF issuances: With DLTF debt, the investor assumes most of the issuance 
risk. Given heightened market uncertainty and the surge in debt issuance, investors 
are expected to want less risk exposure and prefer debt of shorter maturity, or debt 
indexed to foreign currency, a short-term interest rate and possibly inflation. These 
alternatives to DLTF placements are discussed below: 
o More short-term debt: is typically less costly in the short run for the debtor 
and can smooth the impact of higher debt issuance on interest payments  
(inter-temporal risk transfer); such debt is less risky for the investor 
o Ambiguous impact on CPI-indexed debt: in principle better protection for the 
investor, but the crisis has reduced inflation and inflation expectations, 
bringing down the related value of inflation protection 
o More foreign-currency debt: shifts currency risk exposure from the investor to 
the debtor 
o More floating rate debt: is typically less costly in the short run for the debtor; 
transfers risks related to changes in global interest rates and in the country’s 
perceived creditworthiness from the investor to the debtor. 
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Debt, macroeconomic fundamentals and investor confidence are expected to be 
important as well. In recent years, research on the macroeconomic and confidence factors 
determining the composition of government debt has focused on emerging market countries 
and stock data (see, for instance, Jeanne and Guscina (2006), Guscina (2008), Mehl and 
Reynaud (2008), Guscina, Ilyina and Kamil (2010)). However, most insights from this 
analysis carry over to the advanced economies and issuance (gross flows) data. Notably, it 
emphasizes that while DLTF debt is the least risky from the debtor’s standpoint, creditors 
will only accept it at a low interest cost to the extent they view government policies as 
credible and fundamentals as strong. Among other variables, low inflation, associated with a 
prudent monetary policy, and robust economic growth are expected to promote DLTF 
issuance at a low interest cost.  
 
Based upon the recent research on DLTF shares, the following priors can be 
formulated: 
 
 Higher debt has a non-linear effect on DLTF shares and the use of auctions. Debt has 
to achieve a critical mass for liquidity purposes and generate institutional investor 
interest. However, once the debt (as a share of GDP) exceeds a certain threshold, 
sovereign risk is a concern and DLTF instruments are less attractive for investors  
 Higher economic growth (proxied by growth in industrial production) creates more 
favorable conditions for safer and less costly borrowing practices from the 
government’s point of view (more DLTF debt placed via competitive auctions). The 
variable’s effect on total borrowing is negative: higher growth is typically associated 
with lower headline deficits 
 Higher inflation (expectations) will make it harder for governments to issue DLTF 
debt and use auctions. As inflation erodes the returns on nominal debt in real terms, 
investors want to avoid or receive compensation for the risk of real return erosion. 
However, as inflation in the euro area was generally modest in 2007–11, it is unlikely 
to have exceeded the threshold above which inflation could have materially affected 
the choice of debt instrument or selling technique in this period  
 Finally, greater investor confidence in the economy (as proxied by business 
sentiment) will support investor risk appetite and facilitate issuance of DLTF 
instruments using auctions. As a forward looking variable, investor sentiment can be 
more important than macroeconomic fundamentals in determining the success of 
individual auctions (and thus the share of new issues that are placed via auctions). 
Censored Tobit estimation methodology is used for the regression analysis of issuance 
composition. Since DLTF debt shares or auction shares are bounded between zero and one, 
the estimation technique employed has to take into account the limited dependent variable. 
Given the panel structure of our dataset, the possible existence of unobservable country 
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effects also has to be considered. Since unobserved country heterogeneity can bias standard 
Tobit estimation, we resort to random-effects Tobit estimation, which is defined as a 
combination of linear and probabilistic regressions (see, for instance, Greene, Econometric 
Analysis, 2007). 
The results for auction shares are summarized in Table 3A, with equation (6) 
representing the preferred specification. The crisis dummy is highly significant with a 
positive sign in almost all specifications. It implies that the financial crisis as such had a 
positive effect on the share of debt placed via auctions above and beyond the one related to 
the other determinants. While the use of syndication is less risky, it is also more costly. An 
increase in the share of auctions in the crisis period implies that governments in the euro area 
tried to raise funds at the lowest possible cost. Inflation is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level and enters with a negative coefficient. This suggests that macroeconomic 
volatility (proxied by inflation) brings down the share of bonds placed via competitive 
auctions. The level of debt is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in the preferred 
estimation, suggesting that countries with a higher debt stock typically shift to auctions as the 
placement technique of choice. The business sentiment indicator is positive in various 
specifications, suggesting that for competitive auctions to be successful, investor confidence 
mattered more than ex post economic indicators. The result is not robust to including growth 
and spreads, however. The secondary market spread with 10-year US Bond is positively 
associated with the share of auctions. This suggests that as the cost of borrowing increases, 
governments are more likely to use auctions, as opposed to more costly syndicates. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis period dummy 0.831** 1.341*** 1.295** 0.858 1.062* 0.123***
-0.421 (0.515) (0.532) (0.620) (0.627) (0.029)
Sentiment 2.069* 3.998*** 4.067*** 1.834 0.268***
(1.193) (1.194) (1.428) (1.820) (0.096)
Inflation -0.273*** -0.321*** -0.335*** -0.018***
(0.087) (0.102) (0.102) (0.004)
log of CG debt t-12 0.347* 0.381* 0.774***
-0.187 (0.197) (0.072)
Growth in IP 0.049** -0.001
(0.023) (0.001)
Spread with 0.041***
10-year U.S. bond (0.006)
Constant -0.176 -2.292* -3.136** -4.157*** -2.01 -2.961***
(0.568) (1.363) (1.247) (1.589) (1.936) (0.438)
Observations 925 925 925 759 759 711
Number of ID 16 16 16 16 16 15
Wald test 10.74 13.6 28.46 23.54 28.01 219
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The reported results are based on censored tobit effect estimation.   Postcrisis dummy is defined as 0 for January 2007 through June 2008, and 1 for 
July 2008 through December 2009.
Table 3A. Determinants of Auction Share in Total Issuance—Censored Tobit Estimation
  
 
Results for country sub-groupings show considerable heterogeneity (Table 3B.) The 
high debt subgroup has the highest coefficient on the crisis dummy, implying that these 
countries relied relatively more on auctions during the crisis.13 In these high debt countries, 
the stock of debt and investor sentiment matter the most in terms of explaining the share of 
bonds raised at auctions. Higher spreads vis-à-vis the German Bund are also associated with 
a higher share of debt placed via auctions. In the high deficit countries, the crisis variable is 
not significant, but the stock of debt, investor sentiment, and the spread all are associated 
with a higher share of borrowing through auctions. For moderate deficit/moderate debt 
countries, the crisis dummy is significant, and investor sentiment and spreads are significant 
but with the opposite effect than in the two previous country subgroups: these variables are in 
this case associated with lower auction shares. This could be related to flight-to-safety within 
the euro zone in 2010–11, which improved investor sentiments towards these countries and 
                                                 
13
 In the high-debt countries, the volume of primary issuances is also expected to be large enough to ensure 
sufficient liquidity.  
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brought down their spreads. For all country subgroups, inflation is negatively associated with 
the share of bonds issued through the use of auctions with a coefficient which is broadly 
similar across different groups. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base
no Ireland in 






Crisis period dummy 0.123*** 0.117*** 0.014 0.225*** 0.132*** 0.114***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.057) (0.037) (0.041)
Sentiment 0.268*** 0.251*** 0.448*** 1.238*** -0.252* -0.452***
(0.096) (0.096) (0.101) (0.194) (0.129) (0.134)
Inflation -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.017** -0.012*** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
log of CG debt t-12 0.774*** 0.628*** 1.219*** 1.323*** 0.057* 0.067
(0.072) (0.086) (0.063) (0.134) (0.031) (0.047)
Growth in IP -0.001 0.000 -0.003*** 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Spread with 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.066*** -0.188*** -0.085*
10-year U.S. bond (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.033) (0.045)
Constant -2.961*** -2.263*** -5.980*** -6.704*** 0.882*** 0.931***
(0.438) (0.463) (0.519) (1.103) (0.189) (0.243)
Observations 711 703 284 269 427 336
Number of ID 15 15 6 5 9 7
Wald test 219 135.87 661.7 279.9 98.75 61.44
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
High deficit countries include Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, France, and Belgium.
High Debt countries  Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Ireland, and Portugal
The reported results are based on censored tobit effect estimation.   Postcrisis dummy is defined as 0 for January 2007 through June 2008, and 1 for July 2008 through 
December 2009. 
Table 3B. Determinants of Auction Share in Total Issuance—Exploring Heterogeneity
 
 
The results of the panel regressions for the shares of DLTF debt confirm the priors for 
the macroeconomic variables (Table 4A). For the sample as whole, the crisis dummy is not 
statistically significant. However, the coefficient on the inflation rate is negative and 
statistically highly significant; a 1 percent increase in inflation rate is associated with a 
2.5 percent drop in the share of DLTF issuance. Industrial production growth is positively 
associated with the share of DLTF debt, with a coefficient significant at the 5 percent level. 
A one percent increase in industrial production growth is associated with 0.6 of a percent 
increase in the share of DLTF debt. The sentiment indicator is always positive (meaning that 
investors confidence translates into a higher share of DLTF borrowing), but the effect is not 
statistically significant when controlling for other macroeconomic fundamentals such as 
growth in industrial production, exchange rate movements, and secondary market spreads. 
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The debt variable is only significant at the 10 percent level. Spreads with 10-year US Bond 
and changes in the exchange rate are not statistically significant. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Crisis period dummy -6.922*** -2.825 -1.753 -2.219 -4.291 -4.125 -3.825
(2.026) (3.500) (3.519) (3.506) (3.750) (3.749) (3.936)
Sentiment 0.182 0.266** 0.290** 0.037 0.199 0.199
(0.126) (0.133) (0.133) (0.177) (0.225) (0.225)
Inflation -1.310* -1.097 -2.553*** -3.036***  -2.975***
(0.690) (0.692) (0.847) (0.941) (0.972)
Log of CG debt 9.156** 8.313* 8.505* 8.544*
(4.026) (4.958) (4.945) (4.953)
Growth in IP 0.600** 0.597** 0.599**
(0.268) (0.267) (0.267)
Spread with 0.03 0.029
10-year U.S. bond (0.025) (0.026)
Change in euro/dollar -10.517
Exchange rate (42.130)
Constant 56.335*** 36.957** 31.155** -15.992 19.265 2.281 1.743
(7.174) (15.619) (15.837) (25.974) (33.267) (36.180) (36.268)
Observations 391 381 381 381 347 347 347
Number of ID 15 14 14 14 13 13 13
Wald test 11.68 13.63 17.4 22.67 33.82 35.25 35.31
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4A. Determinants of DLTF Issuance—Censored Tobit Estimation
The reported results are based on random effect estimation with three-month moving averages of the variables. Postcrisis dummy is 
defined as 0 for January 2007 through June 2008, and 1 for July 2008 through December 2009.  
 
Results by sub-groupings also in this case suggest heterogeneity (Table 4B). The crisis 
dummy is highly significant in the high deficit and high debt countries, with the expected 
negative sign. This implies that while the crisis did not affect DLTF issuance in all euro area 
countries, it did in countries with a more vulnerable fiscal position, which found it harder to 
borrow in DLTF terms. The macroeconomic indicators, on the other hand, could explain 
changes in the structure of government borrowing in moderate deficit countries. Both 
inflation and growth are highly significant with signs in line with the priors. Higher debt in 
the moderate deficit countries is associated with a higher DLTF share, at the 10 percent level, 
suggesting the presence of the liquidity effects discussed above. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base no Greece High Deficit High Debt 
Moderate 
Deficit
Crisis period dummy -4.291 -4.135 -20.346*** -22.623*** 6.807
(3.750) (4.074) (5.120) (5.386) (5.343)
Sentiment 0.037 0.855 -0.483* 0.194 0.108
(0.177) (0.207) (0.256) (0.220) (0.257)
Inflation -2.553*** -2.507*** -1.327 -0.971 -4.046***
(0.847) (0.918) (0.999) (1.155) (1.380)
Log of CG debt 8.313* 7.687 -13.379 -10.363 10.570*
(4.958) (4.888) (12.638) (7.251) (5.794)
Growth in IP 0.600** 0.534* 0.578 -0.532 1.020***
(0.268) (0.301) (0.529) (0.410) (0.363)
Constant 19.265 14.618 195.433** 166.111*** 1.55
(33.267) (34.757) (79.030) (51.144) (42.235)
Observations 347 320 129 95 218
Number of ID 13 12 4 4 9
Wald test 33.82 30.49 40.39 31.36 25
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
High deficit countries include Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, France, and Belgium.
High Debt countries include Belgium, Greece and Italy.
Table 4B. Determinants of DLTF Issuance—Exploring Heterogeneity
The reported results are based on random effect estimation with three-month moving averages of the variables. Postcrisis dummy is defined as 0 for January 
2007 through June 2008, and 1 for July 2008 through December 2009.
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
This paper has documented and analyzed crisis-related changes in government debt 
issuance practices in the 17 euro zone countries and Denmark. Using a newly constructed 
database on primary market debt issuance during 2007–11, we find evidence of a shift away 
from pre-crisis standards of best funding practices—competitive auctions of debt instruments 
with a fixed coupon, long maturity and local currency denomination (DLTF). Exploiting the 
cross-country panel data dimension of the data, we conclude that the crisis as such and 
changes in the macroeconomic environment and investor sentiment can account for a 
significant proportion of the deviation.  
 
The crisis has forced governments to assume additional risk. Shorter maturities, a foreign 
currency denomination, or a floating rate coupon have reduced investor risk, while giving 
government debt managers the opportunity to limit the immediate impact of the crisis on 
interest payments in return for accepting more risk. The negative effect of the crisis on DLTF 
debt issuance was especially pronounced in high debt euro area countries, and could point to 
a regime change in government debt issuance practices in these countries.  
 
In addition to the crisis, the debt stock, investor sentiment and macroeconomic 
fundamentals continued to have an important impact. The paper’s results in this regard 
are broadly in line with those suggested by previous theoretical and empirical research. In 
particular, a higher debt stock is associated with higher issuance, with a higher share of 
auctions in high debt countries, and with a higher share of DLTF issuance in moderate deficit 
countries. Stronger investor sentiment is associated with lower issuance and facilitates the 
use of auctions. Growth and inflation are highly significant with the expected sign in 
explaining the share of DLTF issuance in moderate deficit countries, but they have limited 
explanatory power as to the use of auctions both in the aggregate and for country sub-
groupings—in line with the theoretical ambiguity of the link between macroeconomic 
variables and the share of auctions in issuances.  
 
Additional contingent exposure is a major concern. Euro zone sovereigns have generally 
assumed more issuance risk and in some cases opportunistically pursued interest cost 
minimization during the crisis. In particular, the shift to shorter maturities, and the issuance 
of floating rate and foreign currency denominated debt allowed governments simultaneously 
to match reduced risk appetite of investors and, in an environment with exceptionally low 
short-term interest rates, limit the impact of higher deficits and debt on interest payments. 
But they also exposed these governments to substantially higher refinancing and repricing 
















Variable Description Source 
Crisis period dummy = 0 for January 2007 - June 2008 time period                              
= 1 for July 2008 - December 2011 time period De Broeck-Guscina Debt Database 
Sentiment  Economic sentiment indicator (SA, long-term average=100)  Haver Analytics 
Inflation 12-month change in harmonized consumer price index          
(SA, 2005=100)  Haver Analytics 
Growth in IP 12-month change in industrial production: industry excluding  
construction (SA/WDA, 2005=100)  Haver Analytics 
Log of CG debt  Log of central government: consolidated gross debt              
(NSA, Mil.EUR-ECU)  Haver Analytics 
Spread with 10-year U.S. bond Spread between long-term interest rate: rolling 12-month  
average (%) in the country and the U.S. Haver Analytics 
Change in euro/U.S. dollar  
exchange rate 12-month change in euro per U.S. dollar  IMF,  World Economic Outlook 
Table A1. Variable Definitions and Sources 
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